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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
ELAINE S. SORENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CLIFFORD G. SORENSEN, 
Case No. 870102 CA 
Priority 14b 
Defendant-Appellant, 
000O000 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Defendant/Appellant, Clifford G. Sorensen, submits 
the following Reply Brief in response to the Brief of 
Respondent Elaine S. Sorensen. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. As was stated in Appellant's 
initial Statement of the Case, it involves errors made by the 
trial court in valuing the Appellant's dental practice; in 
awarding attorney's fees and in requiring Appellant to pay a 
portion of Respondent's expert witness fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No additional facts need be set forth in connection with 
this Reply Brief. Appellant relies on the Statement of Facts 
set forth in his principal Brief on pages 2 through 13 
inclusively. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
Appellant raised five issues on appeal. Four of the 
five have Utah cases directly on point and are dispositive in 
Appellant's favor. The fifth issue, (i.e., failure to 
consider accounts payable), should be decided in Appellant's 
favor based on principles of common sense. 
POINT II 
A. 
The Appellant properly and timely objected to 
Respondent's attempt to place a value on the "goodwill" of 
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. The trial court erred in 
overruling that objection and admitting the evidence. 
B. 
Utah law is clear that the goodwill of a professional 
such as a dentist is not an asset subject to division in a 
divorce case. The trial court erred in placing a value on 
Dr. Sorensen's goodwill and subsequently awarding that 
"asset" to him. 
C. 
The trial court erred in including Dr. Sorensen's 
accounts receivable as an asset which was ultimately awarded 
to him. Under Utah law, a professional's accounts receivable 
are deferred income from which ongoing child support and 
alimony payments are made. 
2 
D. 
The trial court simply ignored Dr. Sorensen's current 
accounts payable in valuing his dental practice and 
consequently the value assigned was at least $10,129.00 too 
high. 
POINT III 
The evidence which Mrs, Sorensen presented in support of 
her request for attorney's fees did not include proof on 
reasonableness, the necessity of time expended, and rates 
commonly charged in divorce actions. Consequently, the award 
should be vacated based on insufficient evidence. 
POINT IV 
The trial court erroneously ordered Dr. Sorensen to pay 
one half of his wife's expert witness fees attributable to 
the real estate appraiser she called to testify on her 
behalf. This is contrary to existing Utah law and the award 
should be vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CASES CITED AND RELIED ON 
BY APPELLANT ARE DISPOSITIVE OF 
THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL. 
In his brief, Appellant has raised five errors committed 
by the trial court. 
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1) It included goodwill as an asset of 
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice; 
2) It included accounts receivable as an 
asset of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice; 
3) It did not include accounts payable 
when valuing the dental practice; 
4) It awarded attorney's fees based on 
insufficient evidence; 
5) It incorrectly required Dr. Sorensen 
to pay a portion of Mrs. Sorensen's 
expert witness fees. 
Of these five issues only the issue dealing with the accounts 
payable does not have a Utah Supreme Court or Utah Court of 
Appeals case which addresses the issue and provides the 
appropriate and applicable statement of law. Respondent, in 
her brief, either ignores the holdings of those cases or 
unsuccessfully attempts to explain away the cases as having 
no applicability. 
GOODWILL 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (Utah 
1966) simply says that in Utah there can be no goodwill of a 
business which depends for its existence upon the qualities 
of the persons who carry it on. (i.e., professionals such as 
lawyers, doctors, accountants and dentists.) It is still the 
law in Utah, as pronounced by the Utah Supreme Court. It is 
a position followed in other jurisdictions as well as Utah. 
The principle of stare decisis should be applied and 
Respondent's assertion that other jurisdictions have decided 
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the issue differently is simply not material. It avoids the 
issue as to what is the present law in Utah. 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
Dogu v. Dogu, 552 P. 2d 1308 (Utah 1982) unequivocally 
states that Dr. Dogu's professional corporation's accounts 
receivable represented deferred income from which he was to 
make his ongoing child support and alimony obligations. The 
trial court did not include those receivables as an asset of 
the corporation and the Utah Supreme Court approved that 
approach again setting forth what the law is in Utah. The 
same facts exist in this case. 
Tallev v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 83 (Utah CA 1987), states 
that evidence as to reasonableness of attorney's fees is 
absolutely necessary to support an award. That is the 
current law in Utah and in this case no evidence related to 
the requirements of Talley, supra, was presented. 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P. 2d 138 (Utah 1980) is likewise a 
statement by the Utah Supreme Court that expert witness fees 
are not to be assessed against one side or the other and to 
do so is error. 
Each of the above cited cases clearly address and 
resolve in Appellant's favor at least four of the five issues 
raised on appeal. The fifth issue related to the trial 
court's failure to consider accounts payable is likewise 
resolved in Appellant's favor simply based on the principles 
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of common sense. 
Respondent has chosen to ignore or only mention in 
passing what the law is in Utah and consequently places the 
principle of the stare decisis "in the back room" out of 
sight and out of mind. If stare decisis is to have any 
meaning and importance whatsoever, then it should be followed 
as should the cases relied on by Appellant in his brief and 
cited above. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
CORRECT IN THE WAY IT VALUED 
APPELLANT'S DENTAL PRACTICE. 
A. 
Respondent's Assertion that Appellant did not 
Object to the Trictl Court's Consideration of 
"Goodwill" is Simply Incorrect. 
Respondent claims that Appellant did not object at trial 
to the issue of goodwill being considered in the valuation of 
Dr. Sorensen7 s dental practice. That is not so! Mrs. 
Sorensen called her expert to place a value on the practice. 
(Vol I, R-54-76) During this examination, Dr. Austin 
testified about his written "qualified" opinion as set out on 
Exhibit "D." (See A-3 3 Addendum to Appellant's Brief.) He 
was then cross examined as to how his conclusions relating to 
value would change if, for example, Dr. Sorensen was to be 
disabled or retire. (Vol I, R-77-89) At the conclusion of 
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his testimony, Respondent then moved for admission of Exhibit 
"D" and Appellant's counsel immediately objected. (Vol I, R-
89) The exhibit and supporting testimony was then received 
by the trial court over Appellant's timely objection. (Vol 
I, R-89) 
Parenthetically when Dr. Sorensen presented his case, 
his accountant testified at no time during the practice had 
goodwill ever been shown as an asset (Vol I, R-3 21) and Mr. 
Roger Nuttal, a second accountant, disputed inclusion of 
goodwill as an asset of the dental practice. (Vol II, R-24) 
Succinctly put, the issue as to whether or not goodwill 
should have been included was presented to the trial court 
and there was a proper objection when the trial court was 
asked by Mrs. Sorensen to consider it. This issue is not 
being raised on appeal for the first time. 
B. 
Utah Follows the Approach of Other 
Jurisdictions in Holding that "Goodwill" 
Should not be Considered as an Asset of a 
Professional Practice. 
Mrs. Sorensen makes the statement on page seven of her 
brief that: 
The g o o d w i l l of a p r o f e s s i o n a l 
p r o p r i e t o r s h i p i s a m a r i t a l a s s e t 
d i v i s i b l e on divorce. 
Id. 
The statement is incorrect for two reasons. First, it is 
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certainly not the law in Utah according to the holding in 
Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667 (Utah 1966), where the Utah 
Supreme Court succinctly stated that: 
Good will cannot arise as an asset of a 
partnership where the parties only 
c o n t r i b u t e , as capital, their 
professional skill and reputation, 
however intrinsically valuable these may 
be. 
Id. at 671. 
The holding and underlying principles set forth in 
Jackson have not been changed or modified and Jackson is 
still the law in Utah. 
Second, while some jurisdictions have decided that a 
professional may possess goodwill subject to consideration in 
a divorce action, others have correctly reached the opposite 
conclusion that it is inappropriate to consider the concept 
of professional goodwill as a divisible marital asset. Based 
upon the Utah Supreme Court's statements in Jackson, supra, 
and more recent statements of this Court pertaining to the 
valuation of professional degrees in Peterson v. Peterson, 
737 P.2d 237 (Utah CA 1987) and Ravburn v. Ravburn, 738 P.2d 
238 (Utah CA 1987), Utah follows the latter position and has 
specifically rejected the position urged by Respondent. 
Utah is aligned with Wisconsin, Texas, Louisiana, 
Kansas, Pennsylvania and New York in holding that 
professional goodwill is not a subject for consideration in 
the division of marital property. Respondent incorrectly 
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argues that this approach is antiquated. To the contrary, it 
is the subject of recent contemporary analysis contained in 
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis.App. 1981). A 
complete copy of this case has been included in the Addendum 
to this Reply Brief. 
In Holbrook, supra, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
reversed the decision of a trial court and directed that the 
goodwill attributable to the husband's law partnership be 
deleted from the trial court's overall property distribution 
and concluded that this was not the correct approach. It 
felt that the better reasoned and more sound analysis was 
that which has been the law in Utah since 1966 when Jackson 
v. Caldwell was decided. 
It criticized the California approach which Respondent 
now urges upon this court, as being "a confusion of rules and 
methods of valuation, compounded by inconsistencies in logic 
and application and conceptual problems over possible 
duplication of spousal support and denial of equal 
protection." Id. at 353. In so holding that professional 
goodwill is not a divisible asset, the court stated: 
We are not persuaded that the concept of 
professional goodwill as a divisible 
marital asset should be adopted in 
Wisconsin. We are not obliged nor 
inclined to follow the twisted and 
illogical path that other jurisdictions 
have made in dealing with this concept in 
the context of divorce. 
The concept of professional goodwill 
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evanesces when one attempts to 
distinguish it from future earning 
capacity. Although a professional 
business's good reputation, which is 
essentially what its goodwill consists 
of, is certainly a thing of value, we do 
not believe that it bestows on those who 
have an ownership interest in the 
business, an actual, separate property 
interestc The reputation of a law firm 
or some other professional business is 
valuable to its individual owners to the 
extent that it assures continued 
substantial earnings in the future., It 
cannot be separately sold or pledged by 
the individual owners. The goodwill or 
reputation of such a business accrues to 
the benefit of the owners only through 
increased salary. 
Id. at 364. 
A similar result was reached by the Kansas Supreme Court 
in 1982 in Powell v. Powell, 648 P.2d 218 (Kansas 1982). 
Mrs. Powell had argued that the trial court should have 
placed a "goodwill value" on Dr. Powell's medical practice. 
The trial court rejected thait request and the Supreme Court 
affirmed stating: 
We are not persuaded a professional 
practice such as Dr. Powell's has a good 
will value. The practice is personal to 
the practitioner. When he or she dies or 
retires nothing remains. The 
professional's files and lists of clients 
are of no use to others. The very nature 
of a professional practice is that it is 
totally dependent upon the professional. 
We refuse to adopt the theory that good 
will in a professional practice is an 
asset subject to division in a divorce 
action. The issue is without merit. 
Id. at 223 & 224. 
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See also Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) a copy 
of which has also been included in the Addendum to this Reply 
Brief. 
As is demonstrated by decisions of the courts in 
Holbrook, Powell, and Nail, supra, and our Supreme Court in 
Jackson, the better rule and in fact, the law in Utah is that 
professional goodwill is not an asset which is the subject of 
valuation division and distributing in a divorce action. 
Consequently, the trial court erred in placing any value 
whatsoever on the "goodwill" of Dr. Sorensen's dental 
practice. 
In addition, if this Court were to adopt such an 
approach, it would necessarily have to reanalyze and change 
its recent decisions regarding requests of litigants to value 
professional degrees — an intangible similar in concept to 
professional goodwill. 
In the recent cases of Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P. 2d 
273 (Utah CA 1987) followed by Ravburn v. Rayburn, 738 P. 2d 
238 (Utah CA 1987) this court concluded that: 
. . . an advanced degree is or confers an 
intangible right which because of its 
character, cannot be characterized as 
property subject to division between the 
spouses. 
Peterson at 241. 
These cases cited with approval the Colorado case of In re: 
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) and 
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like Graham concluded that in Utah a traditional alimony 
analysis was the appropriate method for making adjustments 
between the spouses. 
Likewise, Graham was also analyzed and approved of by 
the Wisconsin Court in Holbrook which analogized a 
professional degree with a professional's goodwill and 
stated: 
Like an educational degree, a partner's 
theoretical share of a law firm's 
goodwill cannot be exchanged on an open 
market: it cannot be assigned, sold, 
transferred, conveyed or pledged. 
Although we recognize the factual 
distinction between a degree-holder and a 
partner or shareholder in a law firm, we 
think the similarities compel analogous 
treatment in a divorce setting. In both 
cases, the "asset" involved is not 
salable (Footnote) and has computable 
value to the individual only to the 
extent that it promises increased future 
earnings. 
There is a disturbing inequity in 
compelling a professional practitioner to 
pay a spouse a share of intangible assets 
at a judicially determined value that 
could not be recilized by a sale or 
another method of liquidating value. 
(Footnote) 
As stated earlier, the goodwill or 
reputation of Quarles & Brady is 
reflected in John's substantial salary. 
This salary was considered in setting the 
family support award. To also treat the 
goodwill of the law firm as a separate 
divisible asset, would constitute double 
counting. (Footnote) 
Id. at 355. 
In the case before this Court, the trial court properly 
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recognized that Mrs. Sorensen's educational achievements 
acquired during the marriage, were an intangible asset 
reflective of her ability to produce income; the court went 
on to conclude that it was not a property right but was taken 
into consideration in connection with the award of alimony. 
At the same time, the trial court inconsistently placed 
a value on a similar intangible of Dr. Sorensen and stated 
that it felt: 
. . . that the large portion of the value 
of the practice has to do with goodwill 
and reputation . . . (R 87) 
It then awarded this "asset" to Dr. Sorensen while also 
ordering him to pay substantial alimony and child support, 
the source of which arose solely from the income produced by 
Dr. Sorensen practicing dentistry. This is the same "double 
counting" described in Holbrook with the additional inequity 
that Mrs. Sorensen's educational achievements were not 
considered as an asset on her side of the ledger. 
Simply put, the trial court followed the principle of 
Peterson and Rayburn in dealing with Mrs. Sorensen's 
educational degrees and ignored those principles in dealing 
with Dr. Sorensen's reputation as a dentist, intangibles so 
similar as to be nearly indistinguishable from one another. 
In Utah, the law related to a professional's goodwill 
and/or educational achievements is well established and has 
clearly been set forth in Jackson v. Caldwell, Dogu v. Dogu 
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Peterson v. Peterson and Rayburn v. Rayburn, supra. In 
deciding Dr. and Mrs. Sorensen's case, the trial court did 
not follow that law and consequently erred resulting in a 
material unfairness and inequity to Dr. Sorensen. 
C. 
The Docru v. Doau Decision Precludes 
Consideration of Accounts Receivable as 
an Asset in Connection with Dr. 
Sorensen's Dental Practice. 
Mrs. Sorensen argues that Dogu v. Docru, 652 P. 2d 13 08 
(Utah 1982) stands only for the proposition that the trial 
court did not abuse its decision in valuing Dr. Dogu's 
professional corporation. This argument might have merit 
were it not for the Utah Supreme Court's explicit statement 
in that case regarding Dr. Dogu's professional corporation's 
accounts receivable. 
In Doau, supra, the court not only affirmed the trial 
court's method of valuing the professional corporation but 
defined and elaborated on the* issue of accounts receivable by 
specifically excluding those* receivables and defining them 
as: 
de fe r r ed income from which 
respondent may meet h i s ongoing alimony 
and c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s t o 
appe l lan t . 
Id. a t 1309. 
Like Dr. Dogu, Dr. Sorensen was required to pay alimony 
and child support. Like Dr. Dogu, Dr. Sorensen should be 
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able to use those receivables, if and when paid, to help him 
meet his ongoing support obligations. It was error and not 
in keeping with the directives of Dogu, supra, to include the 
receivables as an asset to be awarded to Dr. Sorensen. By so 
doing, Mrs. Sorensen received a double benefit and gets not 
only the egg but a piece of the goose that lays it. 
It is specious to argue that accounts receivable may be 
excluded as an asset in one case and included in another case 
depending on the whim and will of the trial court when the 
language of Dogu, supra, very clearly defines what accounts 
receivable are and how they should be handled in relation to 
ongoing support obligations. 
The same issue was presented to the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin in the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d (Wis. 
1977) where a trial courts decision to exclude a physician's 
accounts receivable from consideration in the property 
distribution, was found to be correct. In explaining its 
decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: 
The trial court considered the accounts 
receivable as the equivalent to salary. 
In considering the amount of alimony and 
support to be awarded, it looked to Dr. 
Johnson's salary and his ability to pay. 
It was not error to view the receivables 
as salary. If Dr. Johnson remained with 
the clinic the receivables would be paid 
as salary. If he left, they would take 
the place of salary while he established 
his new practice. Because the 
receivables were viewed as salary, it 
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would have been error to include them in 
the assets available for distribution. 
Id. at 201-202. 
Similarly, Dr. Sorensen's accounts receivables are his 
salary. If he continues to practice dentistry, he will use 
them to pay his salary and from that salary, his sole source 
of income, will be paid his alimony and child support 
obligations. 
The trial court erred in including Dr. Sorensen's 
accounts receivable as an asset of his dental prcictice. 
D. 
Respondent has not Shown that the Trial Court 
Considered Dr. Sorensen's Actual Accounts 
Payable in Attributing a Value to his Dental 
Practice. 
Mrs. Sorensen has briefly and superficially responded to 
Dr. Sorensen's claim that the trial court erred in the 
valuation of the dental practice by not considering and 
subtracting current accounts payable to arrive at a net 
value. She simply says this was taken into consideration by 
her expert in assigning a value to the "intancjible assets" 
referred to in Exhibit "D." (See A-35 Addendum to 
Appellant's Brief.) She goes on to say that this figure was 
used in connection with analyzing Dr. Sorensen's receipts and 
expenses over a three year period to determine average 
profits. 
Current accounts payable can in no way be characterized 
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as intangible. They are very much tangible and must be 
deducted from the value of tangible assets to arrive at a net 
worth of the tangible assets. Neither Mrs. Sorensen's expert 
nor the trial court considered these current liabilities in 
arriving at a value for Dr. Sorensen's dental practice in 
spite of testimony from Dr. Sorensen's accountant that 
$10,129.00 in current payables would have to be considered to 
arrive at an accurate value. (Vol II, p.23) 
Whether or not these payables were reviewed and 
considered in determining the intangible assets is not 
material nor pertinent to the fact they were not considered 
in determining the true value of the tangible assets of Dr. 
Sorensen's practice. (i.e., Fair market value of assets such 
as furniture and equipment minus outstanding debt equals fair 
net value of assets.) 
By not considering these payables, the trial court 
created an unfair imbalance in the property distribution 
without any justifiable reason. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE ON THE 
ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS 
FATALLY DEFECTIVE. 
The trial court's award of attorney's fees was erroneous 
not because of a lack of proof relative to Mrs. Sorensen's 
need but rather because the evidence required as to the 
reasonableness of the fees was totally lacking. 
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There was no testimony, direct or proffered, which 
related to: 
1) the necessity of the number of hours 
dedicated; 
2) the reasonableness of the rate charged 
in light of the difficulty of the case 
and the result accomplished; and 
3) the rates commonly charged for divorce 
actions in the community. 
All of the above is required to support the atward as was 
clearly stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 
P. 2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980) and this Court in Tallev v. 
Talley, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah CA 1987). None of the above was 
presented, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to 
make the award. 
In addition, even assuming arguendo that the above 
evidence is not necessary, the proffer which was presented 
was still defective. The stipulation as to that proffer went 
only to the amount of Mr. Healey's fee as reflected on the 
proposed exhibits (V & X) . The stipulation specifically 
excluded the question of reasonableness of the requested 
fees. The interchange between the Court and counsel clearly 
shows that to be the case (See pp. 2 0 & 21 of Respondent's 
Brief and Vol I, p. 214 & Vol II, p. 171). 
Given these deficiencies, the trial court's attorney's 
fee award should be vacated. 
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POINT IV 
REGARDLESS OF HOW THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ACTIONS REGARDING 
EXPERT WITNESS FEES IS 
CHARACTERIZED, IT WAS STILL 
ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO UTAH 
LAW. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1280 
(Utah 1980) held that it was improper for a trial court to 
require one party to pay the other party's expert witness 
fees related to preparation for and attendance at trial. In 
reversing the trial court's award of those fees characterized 
as costs, the court remanded with instructions that the award 
be adjusted to eliminate any fees awarded above the statutory 
witness fee rate. Id. at 1384. 
In the case before the Court, the parties had acquired 
several pieces of real estate. Mr. Heiskenan, the expert 
whose fees are in question appraised each property and 
testified on behalf of Mrs. Sorensen. Dr. Sorensen called 
his own appraisers to testify as to the value of the 
properties. In comparing the testimony of each appraiser 
with the ultimate decision of the trial court as to value, it 
is clear that all of Mr. Heiskenan's values were accepted by 
the trial court whereas none of the values presented by Dr. 
Sorensen's appraisers were utilized in the overall property 
distribution. It is also important to note that Mr. 
Heiskenan's fees not only included fees related to preparing 
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the appraisals but also fees related to his testimony at 
trial. 
Respondent first argues that because of certain pre-
trial proceedings which required Dr. Sorensen to advance the 
sums necessary to secure appraisals with the ultimate 
decision as to responsibility for payment to be reserved for 
trial, Dr. Sorensen now is in some way precluded from 
challenging the propriety of the trial court's order 
requiring him to pay a portion of those fees. 
Respondent next argues that the fees which Dr. Sorensen 
was ordered to pay are something akin to attorney's fees 
thereby giving the trial court discretion to make an award of 
the same. Both arguments are without merit and in conflict 
with the law as set out in Kerr, supra, and Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
First, the ultimate responsibility for the Heiskenan 
fees was reserved for trial. Dr. Sorensen by approving of 
that approach in no way waived his right to challenge any 
award to be made nor did he expressly or impliedly consent to 
any such award being made prior to the time the issue was 
actually decided by the court. There is nothing in the 
record to support the claim that at any time Dr. Sorensen 
agreed to pay any portion of the Heiskenan fees. That is 
clearly shown by the fact that the issue as to ultimate 
responsibility for payment was reserved for trial. 
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Second, the trial court by apportioning Mr. Heiskenan's 
fees did something that the Utah Supreme Court has said it 
cannot do. It said so in Kerr, supra, also a divorce case 
and in Frampton. supra. Simply put, under the holdings of 
those cases, a trial court cannot order one party to pay the 
expert witness fees of another party absent specific 
statutory authorization. There is no such statutory 
authorization related to expert witness fees in divorce 
actions as is clearly apparent from the Kerr holding. 
Likewise, to argue that the trial court has such 
authority under § 30-3-3 U.C.A. (1953), ignores the fact that 
that statute was in effect when Kerr was decided and the very 
clear statement in Frampton that there are some expenses of 
litigation that simple have to be born by the party incurring 
the expense. 
There is a distinction to be understood 
between the legitimate and taxable 
"costs" and other "expenses," of 
litigation which may be ever so 
necessary, but are not properly taxable 
as costs. (Footnote) Consistent with 
that distinction, the courts hold that 
expert witnesses cannot be awarded extra 
compensation unless the statute expressly 
so provides. (Footnote) 
Frampton. supra, at 774. 
The argument proposed by Respondent is one which would 
require that the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in Kerr 
and Frampton not be followed which is not the prerogative of 
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the trial court or this court to do. The Heiskenan fee award 
should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant raised five issues on appeal. Four of the 
five have Utah cases directly on point and are dispositive in 
Appellant's favor. The fifth issue, (i.e., failure to 
consider accounts payable), should be decided in Appellant's 
favor based on principles of common sense. 
The Appellant properly and timely objected to 
Respondent's attempt to place a value on the "goodwill" of 
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. The trial court erred in 
overruling that objection and admitting the evidence. 
Utah law is clear that the goodwill of a professional 
such as a dentist is not an asset subject to division in a 
divorce case. The trial court erred in placing a value on 
Dr. Sorensen's goodwill and subsequently awarding that 
"asset" to him. 
The trial court erred in including Dr. Sorensen's 
accounts receivable as an asset which was ultimately awarded 
to him. Under Utah law, a professional's accounts receivable 
are deferred income from which ongoing child support and 
alimony payments are made. 
The trial court simply ignored Dr. Sorensen's current 
accounts payable in valuing his dental practice and 
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consequently the value assigned was at least $10,129.00 too 
high. 
The evidence which Mrs. Sorensen presented in support of 
her request for attorney's fees did not include proof on 
reasonableness, the necessity of time expended, and rates 
commonly charged in divorce actions. Consequently, the award 
should be vacated based on insufficient evidence. 
The trial court erroneously ordered Dr. Sorensen to pay 
one half of his wife's expert witness fees attributable to 
the real estate appraiser she called to testify on her 
behalf. This is contrary to existing Utah law and the award 
should be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I day of January, 1988. 
SNT M. KAST] 
Attorneys for Appellant or 
the Appeal 
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a necessary condition to the rendition of a 
valid judgment In any even t and as to 
any of the part owners who may be sued, 
the result is the same as in any other 
suits to foreclose liens where different 
parties have an interest in the subject-
matter of the litigation.9* 
Id. at 213 (quoting Adams v. West Lumber 
Co., 162 S.W. 974 (Tex.Civ.App.1913)). 
We note that Young does not cite any 
law which contradicts the authorities upon 
which our holding is based. We further 
note that Young does not challenge the 
manner in which the County gave him no-
tice of the pending foreclosure action. He 
attacks only the County's failure to give 
Reischl the required notice. 
Order affirmed. 
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103Wis.2d327 
Judith R HOLBROOK, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
John S. HOLBROOK, Jr., 
Defendant-Appellant* 
No. 80-1290. 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin. 
Submitted On Briefs April 15, 1981. 
Opinion Released June 4, 1981. 
Opinion Filed June 4, 1981. 
Review Denied.* 
Appeal was taken from an amended 
judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwau-
kee County, Robert M. Curley, J., in a di-
vorce action. The Court of Appeals, Moser, 
P. J., held that: (1) homestead was properly 
valued as of date the divorce was granted; 
(2) failure to explain rejection of uncontra-
dicted valuations of two automobiles was 
abuse of discretion; (3) trial courts should 
* ABRAHAMSON, J.f not participating. 
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be alert to advantages of dividing retire-
ment benefits a t time of divorce rather 
than postponing actual division until em-
ployee spouse retires especially where there 
is uncontradicted expert testimony on valu-
ation and there are sufficient assets on di-
vorce to divide present value of such bene-
fits without undue hardship; (4) remand 
was required for determination of amount 
of wife's attorney fees and reasonableness 
thereof; and (5) goodwill or intangible val-
ue of husband's partnership interest in law-
firm was not to be included as a marital 
asset 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded with directions. 
1. Divorce «=»253(3) 
Assets of the marital estate are valued 
as of the date the divorce is granted. 
2. Divorce «=»286(6) 
Court of Appeals will not upset a trial 
court's valuations of marital assets unless 
the valuations are against the great weight 
and clear preponderance of the evidence. 
3. Divorce <*=»253(3) 
A judgment of divorce is granted when 
it is orally pronounced from the bench for 
purpose of rule that assets of estate are 
valued as of date divorce is granted. 
4. Divorce <*=» 253(3) 
Parties' homestead was properly valued 
as of date on which divorce was granted 
orally from the bench, i. e., December 10, 
1979, rather than as of date of commence-
ment of trial on September 26, 1979, not-
withstanding that in the interval the mar-
ket had changed and value of home alleged-
ly had fallen by about five to seven percent. 
5. Evidence «=>594 
A court is not required to adopt uncon-
tradicted testimony if it is inherently im-
probable. 
6. Divorce <$=»253(1) 
Where husband's testimony regarding 
blue book value of two automobiles was 
A - l 
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uncontradicted i t was abuse of discretion 
for divorce court to give no explanation of 
its reason for rejecting such valuation. 
7. Divorce <*=» 252^(4), 253(3) 
Valuation and division of pension 
rights on divorce is a matter for the trial 
court's discretion; there are a t least three 
specified ways in which pension rights can 
be valued and divided and which, if any, 
method is appropriate is a discretionary de-
cision depending on the circumstances, sta-
tus of the parties and whether the result is 
a reasonable valuation. 
8. Courts <*=»26 
Exercise of discretion is more than sim-
ply making a decision and requires a rea-
soning process dependent on facts in, or 
reasonable inferences from, the record and 
a conclusion based on proper legal stan-
dards and trial court's failure to set forth 
reasoning used to reach a decision is itself 
an abuse of discretion. 
9. Divorce <*=» 252^(4) 
Trial courts should be particularly alert 
to advantages of dividing a spouse's retire-
ment benefits a t time of divorce rather 
than postponing actual division for a num-
ber of years until spouse retires. 
10. Divorce «=» 252.3(4) 
Where there are sufficient assets avail-
able at time of divorce to divide present 
value of retirement benefits without 
causing an undue hardship on either spouse, 
such method is preferred, especially where 
there is uncontradicted expert testimony on 
valuation. 
11. Divorce <*=» 252^(4) 
Future division of pension rights should 
only be used where the record shows that 
present value determinations are unaccept-
ably speculative or where there are not 
enough assets to equitably require that ben-
efits due in the future be split presently. 
12. Divorce <s=»287 
Remand for recomputation of hus-
band's pension benefits was required where 
divorce court indicated no reason for reject-
ing distribution of present value at time of 
divorce rather than postponing benefits fo» 
a t least 25 years and method of computing 
present value was undisputed. 
13. Divorce <t=»252£(2) 
Equitable division of marital assets did 
not require that homestead be sold and 
proceeds divided; rather, conclusion that 
wife and four minor children, ages 16,14,11 
and three, be permitted to remain in the 
home was reasonable. W.S.A. 767.255(7). 
14. Divorce <t=»240(3) 
Award of $60,000 per year for support 
to wife, who had custody of four children 
ages 16, 14, 11 and three, was not unreason-
able where youngest child was partially dis^ 
abled by cerebral palsy, wife was disabled 
by ankle injury and unable to work and 
husband was a partner in a large and repu-
table law firm where he earned $112,000 
per year. 
15. Divorce «=»308 
Family support is to be determined by 
assessing the family's need and the paying 
spouse's ability to pay. 
16. Divorce <*=>226 
Before awarding attorney fees on di-
vorce, the trial court must determine that 
the spouse receiving the award needs the 
contribution, that the spouse ordered to pay 
has the ability to do so and that the total 
fee is reasonable* 
17. Divorce <*=»287 
Although finding that wife was in need 
of contribution to her attorney fees was 
supported by the evidence, remand for rede-
termination of amount of divorced wife's 
total attorney fees and reasonableness of 
that amount was required as such require-
ment was not satisfied by trial court's de-
termination that $7,500 was a reasonable 
contribution. 
18. Divorce <*=>252.3(1) 
For purpose of division on divorce, the 
marital estate did not include goodwill or 
intangible value of husband's partnership 
interest in reputable law firm; capital 
account value was the only value that 
should have been assigned to his partner-
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jj|p as an asset, although fact that husband 
£*2$£rpartner in a reputable firm was a 
j^operiactor to consider in dividing assets 
*Pw3l as determining amount of family 
jgjSfc W.S.A. 767.255(6), 767.26(5), 767.-
Mtf 
Harry F. Peck and Louise A. Ptacek of 
Petrie, Stocking, Meixner & Zeisig, S. C, 
Milwaukee, on briefs, for defendant-appel-
lant 
Burton A . Stmad of Strnad & Gossens, S. 
C Milwaukee, on brief, for plaintiff-re-
spondent. 
Before DECKER, C. J., MOSER, P. J., 
tad CANNON, J. 
MOSER, Presiding Judge. 
This is an appeal from the property divi-
sion, family support and attorneys' fees 
awards of the amended divorce judgment 
dated September 5, 1980. We vacate, in 
part, the property division and the award of 
attorneys' fees and remand for further 
findings consistent with this opinion. We 
affirm the family support award. 
John and Judith Hoi brook were married 
on July 28, 1962, and remained married for 
eighteen years. At the time of their di-
vorce they had four minor children, ages 16, 
14,11 and 3. Their youngest child is physi-
1* No value for either Judith's or John's bank 
accounts was determined by the trial court. 
The record shows that as of September 26, 
1979, Judith had $650 in a checking account 
and $1,880 in a savings account There is no 
^waVj-for this court to determine the amounts 
[the parties had in their individual accounts as 
of September 5, 1980, the date of the amended 
judgment of divorce. This is a factual determi-
nation that should be made on remand by the 
trial court. 
X. The trial court did not indicate any value for 
any such policies. 
* The trial court ordered that as a further divi-
sion of the estate, John pay Judith $25,000 
forthwith and $500 per month for twenty 
months with nine-percent interest on the re-
maining balance. 
* JW* "goodwill" value was based upon the 
fctfwnony by Judith's expert witness, Mr. Pow-
, HOLBROOK Wis. 3 4 5 
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cally disabled due to cerebral palsy. Judith 
worked as a school teacher for the first two 
years of the marriage while John attended 
law school. After John's graduation from 
law school, Judith did not work outside of 
the home. 
John is currently a partner in the law 
firm of Quarles & Brady, and, at the time 
of the divorce, was earning $112,000 per 
year. 
The trial court divided and valued the 
assets of the parties, as follows: 
Judith: Homestead $162,300 
Household furnishing* $ 15,000 
Cheeking and savings ac-
counts in her name l 
1975 Buick Station Wagon $ 1,000 
All securities owned by either 
or both of the parties ex-
cept the stock in Ashbourne, 
Ltd. $ 3,138 
Life insurance policies on her 
life2 
Cash payment $ 35,000.* 
John: Partnership interest in Quarles; 
& Brady (capital account 
value of $23,790 plus "in-
tangible or goodwill value" 
of $161,330 <) $185,120 
1977 Plymouth Voyager Van $ 3,000 
Checking and savings accounts 
in his name * 
Household goods in his posses-
sion $ 2,000 
Stock in Ashbourne, Ltd • 
ers. The valuation process used by Mr. Powers 
is as follows: 
a. "gross income from personal services" is 
calculated by multiplying billable hours times 
the hourly billing rate. Mr. Powers used 
John's total billable hours in 1978, 1,569 
hours, and multiplied this by a billing rate of 
$100 per hour. (There is nothing in the rec-
ord that indicates that $100 per hour was or 
is John's billing rate) The total arrived at 
was $156,900. 
b. "contribution to overhead" was comput-
ed by multiplying "gross income from per-
sonal services" ($156,900) times the recipro-
cal of the percentage of the law firm's gross 
income (which is represented by the net in-
come to partners). It was determined that 
53.8% of the firm's income was distributed 
to partners. The overhead was therefore de-
termined to be 46.2%. The "contribution to 
5. See note 5 on page 346. 
6. See note 6 on page 346. 
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Additionally, the court valued John's retire-
ment benefits at $12,179, but determined 
that the benefits accrued to the date of the 
original decision should be equally divided 
when John actually receives them, after he 
retires. 
The court found that John's gross income 
was $112,000. Judith was awarded custody 
of the children. The court ordered family 
support payments to Judith and the chil-
dren of $60,000 per year, or $5,000 per 
month (in addition to the cash payment 
ordered as part of the property division). 
John was also ordered to pay $1,000 per 
month for seven months, and $500 in the 
eighth month immediately following the en-
try of judgment This provision appears to 
have been included to cover Judith's attor-
neys' fees. The court further ordered that 
John pay Judith for the income taxes pay-
able for the 1980 temporary family support 
and that he pay for all health care costs for 
the children. 
John makes several claims of error on 
appeal regarding the valuation and distri-
bution of the marital estate, as well as the 
family support and attorneys' fees awards. 
He contends: 
1. that the trial court improperly val-
ued: 
a. the homestead, 
b. the automobiles, and 
c. the retirement benefits; 
2. that sale of the homestead should 
have been ordered: 
3. that the $60,000 annual maintenance 
award was excessive; 
4. that he should not have been required 
to contribute to Judith's attorneys' 
fees; 
overhead" was calculated as $72,488. 
($156,900 X 46 2%) 
c "salary earned from personal efforts" 
was calculated by subtracting the "contribu-
tion to overhead" from the "gross income 
from personal services*" $156,900 minus 
$72,488 equals $84,412. 
d "earnings in excess of salary" was calcu-
lated by subtracting "salary earned from per-
sonal efforts" ($84,412) from gross income 
for 1978 ($111,000) resulting in $26,588. 
e one-half of "earnings in excess of salary" 
was subtracted to allow for income taxes, 
with the rounded result of $13,500. 
5. that the trial court erred in finding 
that John's partnership has a goodwill 
or intangible value which is a marital 
asset to be included in the property 
division; and, 
6. that the trial court erred in establish--
ing a goodwill value of $161,300 be-
cause the calculation of that figure was 
based upon an unproven factual as-
sumption. 
VALUATIONS OF HOMESTEAD, AUTO-
MOBILES AND RETIREMENT 
BENEFITS 
Homestead 
The trial court found that the homestead, 
a large brick home on Newton Avenue in 
Shorewood, Wisconsin, had a value of $152,-
300, subject to a mortgage of $41,962. John 
claims that the trial court erroneously val-
ued the homestead as of December 1979, 
and should have valued it .as of the date of 
the commencement of the trial, September 
26, 1979. John's expert testified that on 
September 26, 1979, the home had a value 
of $185,000. Judith's expert testified at the 
December 10, 1979, hearing that he ap-
praised the home in August of 1979, and 
estimated its value to be $162,000. He tes-
tified also that between August of 1979, 
and December 1979, the market had 
changed and the value of the home had 
fallen by about five percent to seven per-
cent. 
[1,2] Assets of the marital estate are 
valued as of the date the divorce is grant-
f finally. $13,500 was capitalized over 
twenty years at 5'/a% to get a present value 
of $161,330 
5. See note 1, supra 
6. No valuation of this stock was included in the 
original findings of fact and conclusions of law 
or the onginal judgment nor in either the 
amended findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or the amended judgment. According to 
John's testimony, Ashbourne, Ltd. is a family-
owned corporation and the stock has no mar-
ket value 
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4d.* This court will not upset the trial 
Court's valuations of assets unless the valu-
ations are against the great weight and 
clear preponderance of the evidence.8 
Weighing the evidence and determining the 
credibility of witnesses are matters for the 
trial court and, where more than one infer-
ence can reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence, we are obliged, on review, to ac-
cept the one drawn by the trier of fact.* 
[3] The divorce in this case was granted 
orally from the bench on December 10, 
1979.If It is settled law in Wisconsin that 
this is the date for determining the value of 
assets.11 In the absence of exceptional in-
tervening circumstances,12 we are not at 
liberty to conclude that some other date 
should have been used. 
The valuation of assets is a difficult and 
imprecise obligation of a trial judge in a 
divorce action. The values of some assets 
can fluctuate markedly throughout the 
months of a divorce proceeding and, even 
on one given date, there may be several 
conflicting opinions of the value of a certain 
asset As the fact finder, it is the trial 
judge who must draw reasonable inferences 
and come to reasonable, albeit disputable, 
conclusions as to the value of assets as of 
the date the divorce is granted.13 
[4] In this case, the trial court's valua-
tion of the homestead was properly made as 
of the date the divorce was granted and is 
not against the great weight and clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 
7. Dean v. Dean, 87 Wis.2d 854. 871. 275 
N.W2d 902. 909 (1979); Sholund v. Sholund, 
34 Wis 2d 122. 132, 148 N W 2d 726. 731 
(1967) 
8. Carty v Carty. 87 Wis.2d 759. 765. 275 
N W 2 d 888. 890 (1979); Markham v Mark-
ham. 65 Wis 2d 735, 741. 223 N W.2d 616. 619 
(1974) 
9. Markham, supra note 8. at 741. 223 N W 2d 
at 619. 
10. A judgment of divorce is "granted" when it 
is orally pronounced from the bench. Holsch-
bach v. Holschbaciu 30 Wis.2d 366. 368-69. 141 
N.W.2d 214. 216(1966). 
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Automobiles 
We do find error, however, in the valua-
tion of the automobiles. The only testimo-
ny in the record regarding the value of the 
automobiles was John's testimony, based on 
Bluebook values, that the Buick station 
wagon was worth $2,795 and the Plymouth 
van was worth $2,675. There was no other 
evidence of the value of these automobiles. 
However, in the amended findings of fact, 
the trial court valued the Buick station 
wagon at $1,000 and the Plymouth van at 
$3,000. 
[5] A court is not required to adopt un-
contradicted testimony if it is inherently 
improbable.14 However, "[pjositive uncon-
tradicted testimony as to the existence of 
some fact, or the happening of some event, 
cannot be disregarded by a court or a jury 
in the absence of something in the case 
which discredits the same or renders it 
against reasonable probabilities." " 
[6] The trial court gave no explanation 
of its reasons for rejecting the uncontra-
dicted valuations of the automobiles. The 
failure to set forth its reasoning rendered 
its analysis of the valuations incomplete, 
and was an abuse of discretion.1* Accord-
ingly, we vacate the trial court's valuation 
of the automobiles and instruct the court on 
remand to either adopt the uncontradicted 
values testified to at trial ($2,795 for the 
Buick station wagon and $2,675 for the van) 
or to explain what in the case discredited 
these valuations or rendered them improba-
ble. 
11. See note 7. supra. 
12. See Sholund, supra note 7 
13. See notes 7, 8 and 9, supra 
14. Kilgust Heating Div of Wolff, Kubly & Htr-
stgt Inc v Kemp, 70 Wis 2d 544. 549, 235 
N W2d 292, 295 (1975) 
15. Id (quoting Thiel v. Damrau, 268 Wis. 76. 
85. 66 N W 2d 747. 752 (1954)) 
16. See Wisconsin Ass'n of Food Dealers v. City 
of Madison, 97 Wis.2d 426. 434-35, 293 N.W.2d 
540. 545 (1980). 
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Retirement Benefits 
In reference to John's retirement benefits 
from Quarles & Brady, the amended find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law equivo-
cally state: "That the pension plan of 
Quarles & Brady and salary continuation 
program pursuant to the partnership agree-
ment have an aggregate value of $12,179. 
That said amount does not truly reflect the 
value of the program/' The latter state-
ment apparently refers to the admissions by 
the expert who valued the plan at $12,179 ,7 
that there were certain errors made in com-
puting that amount18 The court then went 
on, not to divide the present value of the 
17. John had two forms of retirement benefits: 
a basic pension and a supplemental benefit for 
partners. The total retirement benefits were 
valued through the use of the following calcula-
tion process: 
l. Accrued benefits calculated 
a. average final compensation 
X 20% (provided for in the plan) 
X accrual fraction 
(number of years employed divided 
by expected total number of em-
ployment years at retirement) 
equals accrued basic pension benefit 
average final compensation 
X 5% (provided for in the plan) 
X accrual fraction 
(number of years as partner divided 
by expected number of partnership 
years upon retirement) 
equals accrued supplement benefit 
Present value calculated 
a. basic pension benefit 
accrued benefit 
X annuity value 
X survival factor 
X present value discount 
$1 
$ 
11.176.00 
X 
X 
.20 
••/«• 
8.338.20. 
$111,176.00 
X 
X 
.05 
•/» 
$ 8.338.20 
X 8.0353 
X .70084 
X .23300 
present value of basic pension bene-
fit 
supplemental benefit 
accrued benefit 
X annuity value 
X survival factor 
X discount for withdrawal prior to 
retirement 
$ 10.941.00. 
$ 1.347.59 
X 8.0353 
X .70084 
X .70 
present value of supplemental bene-
fit $ 1.238.00 
Total present value of retirement 
benefits $ 12.179.00 
18. Two errors were made in this calculation 
and were disclosed in the record: first, the 
basic pension benefit plan contained a provi-
sion limiting the "average final compensation" 
amount to $100,000 (this limit does not apply 
retirement benefits, but to order that when 
they become due "[t]he proceeds shall be 
divided equally between the parties based 
upon the pension benefits accrued as of the 
date of the original Decision in this action." 
John contends on appeal that the court 
was obligated to distribute the present val-
ue of the benefits at the time of the divorce 
and that it was error for the trial court to 
postpone, for at least twenty-five years, the 
division of the retirement benefits. 
[7] In Bloomer v. Bloomer19 our su-
preme court recognized that the valuation 
and division of pension rights is a matter 
to the supplemental benefits); and second, the 
retirement plan applicable to John excluded the 
first five years of employment so that the "ac-
crual fraction" for the basic benefit would be 
10/35, rather than 10/40= Correcting for both 
of these errors, the present value for the bene-
fits would be: 
basic pension 
$100,000 
X.20 
X '•/»• 
$ 5.714.00 
X 8.0353 
X .70084 
X .23300 
$ 7.498,00 
supplemental benefits 
$111,176.00 
X.05 
X 7» 
$ 1.348.00 (rounded) 
X 8.0353 
X .70084 
X .2330 
X .70 
$ 1.238.00 
Total = $8,736. 
On remand, should the trial court decide to 
presently divide the pension benefits, it must 
adjust the present value amount of these bene-
fits as indicated above to account for the undis-
puted errors in computation used to arrive at 
the $12,179 figure. However, the trial court is 
not bound by the recalculation set out above to 
the extent that it deems it proper to accept 
John's argument that the "final compensation" 
figure used to begin the calculations should be 
the actual income average for the five years 
preceding the divorce rather than using the 
then-current year's compensation or the $100,-
000 maximum. 
19. 84 Wis.2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978). 
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for the trial court's discretion.2* The court 
explained that there are at least three ways 
that pension rights can be valued and divid-
ed: 
1. the trial court may determine the 
amount of the employee-spouse's con-
tribution to the fund, plus interest, 
and award the other spouse an appro-
priate share; 
2. the court may award the nonem-
ployee-spouse a share of the present 
value of the employee-spouse's retire-
ment benefits when they vest under 
the plan. In addition to discounting 
to present value, further discounting 
should be made to account for the 
probability of death before qualifica-
tion for benefits and for vesting. 
Consideration should also be given to 
the employee-spouse's life expectancy 
as a retiree. This approach may be 
too speculative in some situations;21 
3. the trial court may determine a fixed 
percentage of any future payments 
under the employee-spouse's pension 
plan attributable to earnings during 
marriage to which the nonemployee-
spouse is entitled22 This requires no 
calculation of present value. This 
method is best where present value of 
a pension fund is difficult or impossi-
ble to assess.21 
Which, if any, of these methods is appropri-
ate is a discretionary decision dependent 
"upon the circumstances of the case, the 
status of the parties, and whether the result 
is a reasonable valuation of the marital 
asset"* 
Although it was a discretionary matter 
for the trial court to determine which valu-
ation and division method should be used, 
20. See id at 134. 267 N.W.2d at 240. 
21. See id at 135, 267 N.W.2d at 241. 
22. See id. at 136. 267 N.W.2d at 241. 
23. Selchert v. Selchert, 90 Wis.2d I. 11-12. 280 
N.W.2d 293, 298 (Ct.App.1979). 
24. Bloomer, supra, 84 Wis.2d note 19, at 135, 
267 N.W.2d at 240-41. 
23. See notes 17 and 18, supra. 
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the record does not show why the court 
determined a present value for the pension 
plan ** and then ordered a future divbion of 
the payments as they become due 
[8] Appellate review of discretionary 
decisions is virtually impossible where there 
is no record of the trial court's reasoning in 
reaching a particular conclusion. Our su-
preme court has explained that the exercise 
of discretion is more than simply making a 
decision: it requires a reasoning process 
dependent upon facts in, or reasonable in-
ferences from, the record and a conclusion 
based on proper legal standards.2* "There 
should be evidence in the record that discre-
tion was in fact exercised and the basis of 
that exercise of discretion should be set 
forth." v The failure to set forth the rea-
soning used to reach a decision is an abuse 
of discretion.28 
[9,10] In deciding which method of di-
viding the retirement benefits should be 
adopted in this case, the trial court should 
consider the advantages and disadvantages 
of the various methods. We believe that a 
trial court should be particularly alert to 
the advantages of dividing retirement bene-
fits at the time of divorce rather than post-
poning the actual division for a number of 
years until the employee-spouse actually 
retires. Determining the present value of 
retirement benefits is admittedly specula-
tive, but this is true of valuation of any 
asset. We believe that where there are 
sufficient assets available at the time of 
divorce to divide the present value of the 
retirement benefit without causing an un-
due hardship on either spouse, this method 
is preferred. This method is especially pre-
ferred where, as here, there is uncontradict-
ed expert testimony on valuation. 
26. McCJeary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 277. 182 
N.W.2d 512. 519 (1971); see also D. H. v. State, 
76 Wis.2d 286. 310. 251 N.W.2d 196. 205 
(1977); Stare v. Hutnik, 39 Wis.2d 754, 764, 
159 N.W.2d 733, 737-38 (1968). 
27. McCleary, supra, 49 Wis.2d note 26, at 277, 
182 N.W.2d at 519. 
28. Id at 277-78, 182 N.W.2d at 520. 
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[11] Although the future division meth-
od adopted by the trial court in this case b 
an acceptable method of division, we believe 
that it should only be used where the record 
shows that present value determinations 
. are unacceptably speculative or where there 
are not enough assets to equitably require 
that benefits due in the future be split 
presently. 
[12] In this case, the method of comput-
ing the present value of the retirement 
benefits was undisputed (although the actu-
al computation contained errors which are 
corrected in our footnote 18). The court 
indicated no reasons for rejecting this 
method and for opting for the less pre-
ferred future division method. According-
ly, on remand we instruct the trial court to 
either adopt the present value method or to 
set forth its reasoning, under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, for delaying the 
division until some undetermined future 
date. 
SALE OF THE HOMESTEAD 
[13] John contends on appeal that in 
order to accomplish an equitable division of 
the marital estate, the homestead should be 
sold and the proceeds divided. We think 
the conclusion that Judith and the children 
should be permitted to remain in the home 
is reasonable. The amount of equity the 
Hoi brooks have in the home, the costs and 
disruption of moving, the age of the chil-
dren, and the current cost of financing a 
new home are factors which support the 
trial court's conclusion. There is also a 
statutory preference for this result.2* How 
Judith allocates the funds provided by the 
property division and family support to cov-
er the upkeep of the home should be left to 
her. 
FAMILY SUPPORT 
[14] Judith was awarded $60,000 per 
year for family support. John contends 
that this is excessive. We do not believe 
that the family support award is unreason-
able under the circumstances in this case. 
29. Sec. 767 255(7) (formerly sec. 247.255(7)). 
Stats. 
[15] Family support is to be determined 
by assessing the family's need and the pay. 
ing spouse's ability to pay.39 We think both 
considerations support the award in this 
case. 
Judith has the responsibility of feeding, 
clothing and generally caring for four mi-
nor children, one of whom is, at least to 
some extent, physically disabled by cerebral 
palsy. The record also shows that Judith is 
disabled by an ankle injury which makes 
her unable to work. In contrast, John is a 
partner in a large and reputable law firm 
where he is earning $112,000 a year. 
The trial court indicated its reasons for 
awarding $60,000 in family support in its 
memorandum decision written in response 
to a motion to amend the original findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and the origi-
nal judgment. The court indicated that it 
had reexamined the award and declined to 
change its determination that the amount 
was fair and reasonable. The court, deter-
mined that, although two of the children 
were approaching the age of majority, the 
award should not be changed and when the 
children do reach majority, John can bring 
a motion for reduction of family support 
based on the change of circumstances. 
The memorandum decision and the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law indicate 
that the trial court exercised its discretion 
based upon proper factors and set forth at 
least some of its reasoning in the record. 
We find no abuse of discretion and there-
fore defer to the trial court's judgment 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Originally, John was ordered to pay $15,-
000 toward Judith's attorneys' fees. On 
reconsideration of this issue, the court stat-
ed: 
The court has again reviewed the file and 
determines that that would be the 
amount of [Judith's attorneys'] total fee 
and agrees with counsel for the defend-
30. See Czatcki v. Czaicki, 73 Wis.2d 9. 18. 242 
N.W.2d 214, 218 (1976). 
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ant that to require defendant to pay the 
total fee would be unfair. Therefore the 
court sets as a reasonable contribution, 
under Anderson v. Anderson, 72 WisJM 
631,242 N.W.2d 165f the sum of $7,500 to 
be paid in the manner described earlier. 
The court further finds that there is a 
demonstrated need for the plaintiff to 
receive this assistance by way of a contri-
bution and further there is a demonstrat-
ed ability on behalf of the defendant to 
pay the same, and that the sum fixed by 
the court is a fair and reasonable sum. 
[16] Before awarding attorney's fees, 
the trial court is required to make the fol-
lowing factual determinations: 
1. the spouse receiving the award needs 
the contribution; 
2. the spouse ordered to pay has the 
ability to do so; and, 
3. the total fee is reasonable (this pro-
vides guidance in determining what is 
a reasonable contribution).31 
[17] John disputes the trial court's de-
termination that Judith needed the contri-
bution to her attorneys' fees. We do not 
believe that the trial court's finding of need 
was against the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence. 
However, we must, nonetheless, remand 
the issue to the trial court for a determina-
tion of the amount of Judith's total attor-
neys' fees and the reasonableness of that 
amount "In the absence of some indica-
tion as to what the total fee is, this court is 
left to surmise as to whether the proper 
balance was struck between the former 
wife's needs and the divorced husband's 
ability to pay."52 This requirement is not 
31. Selchert, supra, 90 Wis.2d note 23, at 15-16. 
280 N.W.2d at 300 (Ct.App. 1979); see also An-
derson v. Anderson, 72 Wis.2d 631, 646, 242 
N.W.2d 165. 172 (1976). 
32. Anderson, supra note 31, at 646, 242 N.W.2d 
at 173. Although the court stated in the above 
quoted excerpt from its memorandum decision 
that the original award of $15,000 would cover 
Judith's attorneys' total fee, we find no indica-
tion from the record of the actual amount of 
attorneys' fees owed. In the trial brief, Judith's 
attorneys state that Judith "incurred substan-
tial expense in the litigation of this matter" due 
r. HOLBROOK Wis. 351 
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satisfied by the trial court's determination 
that $7,500 was a reasonable contribution. 
It must first be determined what the total 
fee actually is and whether it is reasonable. 
Without this determination, we cannot re-
view the reasonableness of the contribution. 
INCLUSION OF GOODWILL AS 
AN ASSET 
The major dispute in this appeal focuses 
on the trial court's determination that the 
goodwill or intangible value of John's part-
nership interest in Quarles & Brady is a 
marital asset which must be considered in 
the property division. John also disputes 
the court's determination that this asset 
had a value of $161,300.a He claims that 
the method of calculating this value was 
based on completely unsupported factual 
assumptions, specifically, the assumption of 
a $100 per hour billing rate. 
John contends that the intangible or 
goodwill value of the partnership is not an 
asset or any kind of property. He argues 
that the only property interest in the part-
nership consists of his "capital account" of 
$23,790.96, the contractually determined, 
fixed amount payable to him upon with-
drawal from the firm. 
[18] We conclude that the trial court 
erred in determining that the marital estate 
included the goodwill value of John's part-
nership. We therefore do not address the 
issue of the method of valuation. 
Defining the Concept 
Goodwill has been defined thusly: 
to the use of many experts, the custody dis-. 
pute, various motions, depositions and confer-
ences with doctors and experts. It was assert-
ed that many hours were spent preparing for 
trial. In conclusion it was asserted that "a 
reasonable contribution towards attorneys' fees 
and expert witness fees would be $13,500.00." 
It is not at all clear if that was meant to be a 
statement of what the total fee was. If so, we 
are at a loss to determine where the court 
arrived at its original $15,000 figure. 
33. See note 4, supra. 
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[TJhe advantage or benefit which is ac-
quired by an establishment beyond the 
mere value of the capital stock, funds, or 
property employed therein, in conse-
quence of the general public patronage 
and encouragement which it receives 
from constant or habitual customers on 
account of its local position, or common 
celebrity, or reputation for skill or afflu-
ence, or punctuality, or from other acci-
dental circumstances or necessities, or 
even from ancient partiality or preju-
dices.34 
The favor which the management of a 
business wins from the public . . . The 
fixed and favorable consideration of cus-
tomers arising from established and well-
conducted business . . . . The favorable 
consideration shown by the purchasing 
public to goods known to emanate from a 
particular source . . . . Something in 
business which gives reasonable expect-
ancy of preference in race of competi-
tion.3* 
Originally, goodwill was said to exist only 
in commercial business, and not in a profes-
sional business which depends upon the skill 
and reputation of a particular person.*1 
Because goodwill has no existence apart 
from the business to which it attaches, 
courts have determined that there can be no 
income tax deduction for loss of goodwill; ** 
the loss of goodwill cannot be compensated 
for in eminent domain proceedings; M good-
will cannot be used to satisfy debts; * nor 
is it subject to depreciation.4* 
34. 38 Am.Jur.2d. Goodwill § 1 (1968); see J. 
Story, Commentaries on the Law of Partner-
ships § 99 at 170 (6th ed. J. Gray, ed., 1868). 
35. Black's Law Dictionary 625 (5th ed. 1979) 
[citations omitted.] 
36. Am.Jur.2d, Goodwill § 8 (1968); Lurvey, 
Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: 
Is It Property or Another Name for Alimony7 
Jan./Feb. 1977 Gal.State Bar J. 27, 29 (herein-
after Lurvey). 
37. Lurvey, supra note 36, at 29 citing Red Wing 
Malting Co. v. Willcuts,' 15 F.2d 626, 633 (8th 
Cir. 1926). 
38. Id. citing inter alia 27 Am.Jur.2dt Eminent 
Domain § 287. 
In an article criticizing the rather unst* 
ble and inconsistent development ot^tht, 
concept of professional goodwill in marital 
dissolutions in California, Ira Lurvey yumxa 
out that some view goodwill as something 
that can only be ascertained upon the actu-
al sale of a business.41 However, "(sjuch 
protection of the real marketplace is miss-
ing . . . from the hypothetical sale ordered 
on dissolution of marriage. There is nei-
ther a real buyer nor a real seller.'" ** Mr. 
Lurvey asserts that in light of this and the 
other attributes of goodwill discussed above 
it is: 
at least arguable that "goodwill,"1 by 
whatever name designated, is only an ejh 
try in an accounting statement arrived at 
by hindsight to accommodate any amount 
paid or received on transfer of a going 
business beyond the value attributable to 
its tangible assets. 
Thus at best "goodwill1* is intangible. 
It is also amorphous, ephemeral, elusive; 
and, by general definition, speculative 
and uncertain except to the extent that it 
has already been established by an arms-
length bargaining in the open market 
place.43 
Professional Goodwill as a Marital Asset in 
Other Jurisdictions 
With an apparent lack of deliberative-
ness, the California courts have developed 
the view that the goodwill of a professional 
practice is an asset which must be account-
ed for upon dissolution of a marriage.44 
39. Id. citing Ulienthal v. Dnicklieb, 84 F. 918, 
918-19 (C.C.N.Y.1898). 
40. Id. citing Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 
15 F2d 626. 629, 632-34 (8th Cir. 1926). 
41. Id. at 30. 
42. Id. [Footnote omitted, emphasis in origi-
nal.] 
43. Id 
44. Id. at 30, 78-83. Golden v. Golden, 270 
Cal.App.2d 401, 404-05. 75 Cal.Rptr. 735. 737-
38 (1969) is often cited as the leading case for 
this rule. Golden involved a medical practice 
in which the husband was a sole practitioner. 
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However, the cases are inconsistent in their 
treatment of goodwill. It is not clear 
whether it is truly a separate asset to be 
valued and divided,4* or whether it is actu-
ally "the vehicle whereby the established 
employment or earning capacity of the hus-
band, which often 'constitutes the most val-
uable economic asset of the parties/ was 
divided as community property."4* The 
California position is further obscured by 
the determination in one case involving the 
dissolution of a law partnership and not a 
divorce, in which it was ruled that goodwill 
cannot be divided between partners when a 
law partnership is dissolved because it had 
attached to the individual partners, had no 
monetary value, and could not be sold.47 
Subsequently, in the first California divorce 
case involving the issue of goodwill in 
which the husband-professional was not a 
sole practitioner, but a partner,48 the court 
stated that the existence and value of good-
will must be determined regardless of 
"whether related to that of a sole practi-
tioner, a professional partnership or a pro-
fessional corporation." *• 
The California rule has been adopted in 
Washington.5* 
The California approach has been de-
servedly criticized as a "confusion of rules 
and methods of valuation, compounded by 
45. See Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal App 2d 786, 792-
93, 78 Cal.Rptr. 131. 135-36 (1969) 
46. Lurvey, supra note 36, at 82 [emphasis in 
original] quoting In re Mamage of Rosan, 24 
CaLApp.3d 885. 898. 101 Cal.Rptr. 295, 304 
(1972). 
47. Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal.App.2d 519. 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 829. 833 (1966). 
48. In re Mamage of Lopez, 38 Cal App 3d 93, 
113 Cal Rptr. 58 (1974) 
49. Id at 109, 113 Cal Rptr at 68; see Adams, 
Professional Goodwill as Community Property 
How Should Idaho Rule?, 14 Idaho L Rev 473 
(1978). 
50. See In re Mamage of Lukens, 16 Wash App 
481. 558 P2d 279 (1976) This case conflicts 
with the early Washington case of Lockhart v. 
LockharU 145 Wash. 210, 259 P 385 (1927). m 
which the court, although recognizing the ex-
300 NWJ24—9 
. HOLBROOK Wis. 3 5 3 
,St»N.W.2dM3 
inconsistencies in logic and application and 
conceptual problems over possible duplica-
tion of spousal support and denial of equal 
protection.*'Sl 
An equally criticizable and anomalous sit-
uation exists in Texas where the inclusion 
of professional goodwill as an asset in the 
marital estate is dependent upon whether 
the professional involved is a sole practi-
tioner or a member of a professional part-
nership or corporation. 
Nail v. Nail9* involved an opthalmologist 
who had established a sole medical practice. 
The Texas Supreme Court determined that 
the goodwill of a sole practitioner's business 
does not possess value or constitute an asset 
separate from the individual and his ability 
to continue practicing and would cease to 
exist if the individual withdrew from the 
business.M Accordingly, the supreme court 
determined that the wife's community in-
terest in the medical business did not ex-
tend to the enhanced value attributable to 
goodwill. This enhanced value, the court 
said, was merely an expectancy completely 
contingent on the continuation of existing 
circumstances and therefore was not a vest-
ed property right subject to division upon 
divorce.54 
istence of goodwill in a professional business, 
ruled that upon divorce a wife is not entitled to 
a portion of its value because goodwill attached 
to the husband and could be abandoned at any 
time. Id at 213, 259 P at 387, Adams, supra 
note 49. at 479. 
51. Lurvey, supra note 36, at 85. To the extent 
that the recognition of goodwill in divorce is 
really an effort to divide "the value that had 
accrued during the marriage to the establish-
ment of the husband's career, in whatever field, 
and his resultant income," the equal protection 
question anses* Is it not an arbitrary and capri-
cious distinction to apply the doctrine only to 
professional spouses, individually or as part-
ners, but not to salaried employees7 Id at 84 
52. 486 S W 2d 761 (Tex. 1972) 
53. Id. at 764. 
54. Id 
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However, in Geesbreght v. Geesbreght** 
the court of civil appeals determined that 
goodwill may exist as an asset of a profes-
sional partnership or corporation separate 
from any individual member. That case 
involved a multi-member medical corpora-
tion, which the court said could acquire its 
own reputation or goodwill, despite changes 
in personnel. Hence, the goodwill of the 
corporation should be accounted for in eval-
uating the practitioner's interest in the 
business.54 
The inconsistencies and inequity of the 
distinctions of Nail and Geesbreght have 
been noted and criticized.57 
Even greater problems arise when, after 
it has been determined that professional 
goodwill is a marital asset divisible upon 
divorce, attempts are made to place a dollar 
value on the goodwill that is part of the 
marital estate. This would be especially 
problematic, where, as here, the business 
involved has several members, all of whom 
have presumably contributed to the good-
will of the business. Valuation of one indi-
vidual's goodwill interest in the business 
would be almost pure speculation. 
Professional Goodwill in Wisconsin 
We are not persuaded that the concept of 
professional goodwill as a divisible marital 
asset should be adopted in Wisconsin. We 
are not obliged nor inclined to follow the 
twisted and illogical path that other juris-
dictions have made in dealing with this 
concept in the context of divorce. 
The concept of professional goodwill eva-
nesces when one attempts to distinguish it 
from future earning capacity. Although a 
professional businesses good reputation, 
which is essentially what its goodwill con-
sists of, is certainly a thing of value, we do 
not believe that it bestows on those who 
have an ownership interest in the business, 
an actual, separate property interest. The 
55. 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.Civ.App.1978) writ dis-
missed. 
56. Id. at 436. 
57. Note. 11 St. Mary's L.J. 222 (1979). 
reputation of a law firm or some other 
professional business is valuable to its indi-
vidual owners to the extent that it assures 
continued substantial earnings in the fu-
ture* I t cannot be separately sold or 
pledged by the individual owners. The 
goodwill or reputation of such a business 
accrues to the benefit of the owners only 
through increased salary. 
We think this case is analogous to the 
situation in DeWitt v. DeWitt** in which 
this court determined that a professional 
education or the increased earning capacity 
tha t it confers upon the spouse who holds it 
is not a divisible marital asset, even though 
the acquisition of the degree is partly at-
tributable to the earnings and efforts of the 
other spouse. This court quoted, with ap-
proval, the reasoning of In re Marriage of 
Graham: ** 
An educational degree . . . is simply not 
encompassed even by the broad views of 
the concept of "property." It does not 
have an exchange value or any objective 
transferable value on an open market I t 
is personal to the holder. It terminates 
on death of the holder and is not inherita-
ble. I t cannot be assigned, sold, transfer-
red, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced 
degree is a cumulative product of many 
years of previous education, combined 
with diligence and hard work. It may 
not be acquired by the mere expenditure 
of money. I t is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist 
in the future acquisition of property. In 
our view, it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense; of that term. 
I t was further explained in DeWitt that 
valuing a professional degree as a marital 
asset necessarily requires division of the 
post-divorce earnings of the degree-holding 
spouse, which is inconsistent with the re-
quirement that only assets acquired during 
marriage can be divided.* 
58. 98 Wis.2d 44, 53-54, 296 N.W.2d 761. 766 
(Ct.App.1980). 
59. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75. 77 (1978). 
60. DeWitt, supra, 98 Wis^d note 58, at 54. 296 
N.W.2d at 766. 
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Like an educational degree, a partner's 
theoretical share of a law firm's goodwill 
cannot be exchanged on an open market: it 
cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, con-
veyed or pledged. Although we recognize 
the factual distinction between a degree-
holder and a partner or shareholder in a law 
firm, we think the similarities compel anal-
ogous treatment in a divorce setting. In 
both cases, the "asset" involved is not sala-
ble *' and has computable value to the indi-
vidual only to the extent that it promises 
increased future earnings. 
There is a disturbing inequity in compel-
ling a professional practitioner to pay a 
spouse a share of intangible assets at a 
judicially determined value that could not 
be realized by a sale or another method of 
liquidating value.*1 
There is no dispute in this case that upon 
withdrawal from the partnership, John 
would be entitled to receive only his capital 
account value of $23,790. Ethically and 
contractually, he is prevented from other-
wise disposing of his interest in Quarles & 
Brady. The capital account value is the 
only value that should have been assigned 
to his partnership as an asset 
As stated earlier, the goodwill or reputa-
tion of Quarles & Brady is reflected in 
John's substantial salary. This salary was 
considered in setting the family support 
award. To also treat the goodwill of the 
law firm as a separate divisible asset, would 
constitute double counting.0 The fact that 
John is a partner in a reputable law firm is, 
however, a proper factor to consider in di-
viding the assets, as well as determining the 
amount of family support.*4 If circum-
stances warrant future amendment of the 
61. Itv contrast, a commercval busvcvess, unclud-
mg any goodwill value, is salable We do not 
think the same inequities anse when the good-
will value of a commercial business is included 
in the assessment of the total worth of the 
business for purposes of property division 
See Spheens v Spheens, 37 Wis 2d 497, 504-
07, 155 N W 2d 130, 134-36 (1967) 
62. See Note, 11 St Mary's L.J 222, 230 (1979) 
63. See Kronforst v Kronforst, 21 Wis 2d 54. 
63-64, 123 N.W 2d 52S-534 (1963) in which the 
supreme court found that it was error to m-
HOLBROOK Wis. 355 
M0N.W.2d343 
family support award, this may be done.** 
We think that this is a more direct and 
reasonable way of accounting for John's 
professional position. 
Judith's contribution to the furtherance 
of John's legal career is reflected in the 
home, furnishings and other tangible assets 
that the family has acquired over the years. 
Indeed, she was awarded a great deal of 
these family assets in the divorce. 
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's 
valuation of John's partnership to include 
goodwill and order on remand that the un-
disputed value of $23,790 be assigned to 
that property. 
That part of the judgment regarding the 
family support award is affirmed; the valu-
ation and disposition of the homestead are 
also affirmed. The remainder of the prop-
erty division section of the judgment is 
vacated and the matter remanded for fur-
ther findings consistent with this opinion 
with regard to the following items: the 
valuation of the automobiles, the valuation 
of the retirement benefits, the valuation of 
the parties' individual bank accounts, the 
valuation of the stock in Ashbourne, Ltd., 
and the valuation of John's partnership in-
terest at Quarles & Brady. The portion of 
the judgment granting the award of attor-
neys' fees is vacated and remanded for fur-
ther findings consistent with this opinion. 
The trial court is instructed to reconsider 
the division of the assets after these find-
ings are made. 
dude, a. pcoftt-sKacux^ txust as aa asset CQC 
property division purposes and then also as an 
income source to be considered in awarding 
alimony. The same rule was applied in John-
son v Johnson, 78 Wis 2d 137, 143, 254 N W 2d 
198, 201-02 (1977) to the accounts receivable 
of a medical business 
64. See sees. 767 255(6) (previously 247 255(6)) 
and 767 26(5) (previously 247 26( 1 Xe)). Stats 
65. See sec. 767 32(1) (previously 247 32(1)). 
Stats. 
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James B. NAIL, Jr., Petitioner, 
v, 
Alice J. NAIL, Respondent. 
No. B-3317. 
Supreme Court of Texas 
Nov. 8, 1972. 
Divorce proceeding The District 
Court, No 89, Wichita County, Driver, J„ 
granted divorce to wife and divided prop-
erty of parties and the husband appealed-
The Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals, 
Second Supreme Judicial District, Brewster, 
J , 477 S.W.2d 395 affirmed and the hus-
band brought error The Supreme Court. 
Steakley, J , held that accrued good will of 
husband's medical practice did not con-
stitute property subject to division as part 
of parties' estate. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Tex. 761 
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divorce proceeding the accrued good will of 
the medical practice of the husband, a doc-
tor of medicine specializing in Ophthal-
mology, based as it is on his personal skill, 
experience and reputation, as well as upon 
his continuing in the practice, constitutes 
property that is subject to division as part 
of the estate of the parties The trial court 
and a divided court of civil appeals con-
sidered that it was 477 S W2d 395. We 
hold that it was not. 
Divorce <§=>249(3) 
4HMHfeHH «£> 
&$* 
* 
dm 
• H H I W I ! 
mw T.C.A. 
*m 
Family Code, §§ 3 59, 3 63, Vernon's Ann-
CivSt arts. 2328b-4, § 2(f), 4637. 
Fillmore, Parish, Martin, Kramer & Fill-
more, Howard L. Martin, Wichita Falls, 
for petitioner. 
Fnberg, Martin & Richie, Gene Richie, 
Wichita Falls, for respondent. 
STEAKLEY, Justice. 
Section 3.63 of the Texas Family Code l 
requires the Court in a decree of divorce 
to "order a division of the estate of the 
parties in a manner that the court deems 
just and right . . " The con-
trolling question here is whether in this 
The problem is posed in this manner. 
Petitioner, Dr. James B Nail, Jr and his 
wife, Alice J Nail, Respondent, were mar-
ried m 1945. He was subsequently li-
censed to practice mediane and has prac-
ticed in Wichita Falls, Texas, since 1956. 
His wife sued him for divorce which was 
granted by judgment dated August 12, 
1971. The court ordered a division of the 
estate of the parties and that which is ques-
tioned here is the following grant to Alice 
J. Nail in the decree of divorce: 
"The Court finds that the value of 
Alice J. Nail's community interest in said 
medical practice, including the good will 
accrued thereto, to be the sum of $40,-
000 00. This sum shall be paid to Alice 
J Nail by James B Nail, Jr at the rate 
of $400 00 per month for a period of 
twenty-four (24) months beginning 
August 1, 1971, and continuing to July 1, 
1973 Beginning August 1, 1973, the 
monthly payments from James B. Nail, 
J r to Alice J Nail shall be reduced to 
$300 00 per month and shall continue 
thereafter until the total sum of $40,000.00 
shall have been paid by James B. Nail, 
J r to Alice J. Nail, or until the said 
James B Nail, J r shall cease to prac-
tice medicine " 
The supporting findings of fact and con-
clusions of law of the trial court were 
these * 
"That except for the cruel conduct on 
the part of the said James Barry Nail, 
Jr. to Alice Jane Nail, the marriage could 
have continued. 
I. Vernon's Texas Codes Annotated, Family Code. 
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"That had the marriage continued, 
Alice Jane Nail would have had the bene-
fit of community income in the approx-
imate sum of $53,000.00 per year. 
"That during their marriage, James 
Barry Nail, Jr., completed his pre-medical 
education, graduated from medical school, 
completed his internship and his resi-
dency in opthalmology. 
"That Alice Jane Nail and James 
Barry Nail, Jr., accumulated and now 
own the following community property: 
(a) The house and lots located at 4502 
Martinique Street, Wichita Falls, 
Texas; 
(b) Valuable household fixtures, fur-
nishings and appliances located in 
the home at 4502 Martinique Street, 
Wichita Falls, Texas, 
(c) The medical practice of James 
Barry Nail, Jr. , 
(d) Two automobiles; and 
(e) One boat and motor. 
"There are no liquid assets owned by 
the community estate of Alice Jane Nail 
and James Barry Nail, Jr. 
"That the value of the assets of the 
medical practice of James Barry Nail, 
Jr., is $131,759.64, including all fixtures, 
furniture, equipment, and the value of 
the good will that has accrued thereto 
during the marriage of Alice Jane Nail 
and James Barry Nail, Jr. 
"That the approximate value of De-
fendant's office equipment and office 
furniture is $735.47. 
'That James Barry Nail, Jr., has an 
earning capacity of approximately $52,-
000.00 per year. 
"That the earning capacity of James 
Barry Nail, Jr., will increase in subse-
quent years. 
"That Alice Jane Nail is not trained 
for any employment 
"I conclude from a consideration of the 
respective ages of the parties, their earn-
ing capacities and abilities, the conduct 
of the Respondent toward the Petitioner, 
what the Petitioner could have reason-
ably expected to receive from a continua-
tion of the marriage, except for the con-
duct of the Respondent, and from all other 
factors that it is fair and equitable to 
grant to the Petitioner Alice Jane Nail, 
the following property • 
(a) . . . 
(b) . . . 
(c) . . . 
(d) A community interest in the med-
ical practice of James Barry Nail, Jr., 
in the sum oi $40,000.00, which said 
sum shall be payable at the rate of 
$400 00 per month for a period of 24 
months beginning August 1, 1971, and 
continuing until July 1, 1973. Begin-
ning August 1, 1973, the monthly pay-
ments of James Barry Nail, Jr. to Alice 
Jane Nail should be reduced to $300.00 
per month and continue thereafter until 
the total of $40,000.00 shall have been 
paid by James Barry Nail, Jr., to Alice 
Jane Nail, or until the said James 
Barry Nail, Jr. shall cease to practice 
medicine; . . . " 
It is to be observed that the decree of 
the court was not based upon a permissible 
agreement between the parties for support 
payments to the wife after divorce; nor 
was it in terms of a court imposed personal 
obligation of the husband for support of the 
wife after divorce that would constitute 
permanent alimony not sanctioned by the 
statutes and public policy of Texas. See 
Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 
1967), Art. 2328b-4, § 2(f), Art. 4637, Ver-
non's Ann.Civ.St, and Sec. 3.59 of the Tex-
as Family Code. Rather, the decree in the 
respects under attack purported to be an 
exercise of the discretionary powers of the 
trial court in effecting a just and right divi-
sion of the estate of the parties. 
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As noted, the trial court found the value 
of the husband's medical practice to be 
$131,759.64, inclusive of fixtures, furniture, 
equipment and accrued good will; but the 
court further found the value of the furni-
ture and equipment to be only approxi-
mately $735.47, thus leaving a valuation of 
accrued good will in the sum of $131,024.17. 
The further finding that the wife's com-
munity interest therein was $40,000.00 was 
derived, at least in part, from the testimony 
of a witness offered by the wife as an ex-
pert that the valuation of the good will of 
a professional practice would have "a start-
ing point" of "multiplying one full year's 
billings by one or one and a half". This 
seems so in light of the trial court finding 
that the husband had an annual earning 
capacity of approximately $52,000, one and 
one-half of which would be $78,000. In any 
event it is apparent that the award to the 
wife of $40,000, payable in future monthly 
installments if, and so long as, the husband 
practiced his profession, rested upon the 
conclusion that the accrued good will of 
the husband's practice constituted property 
which was subject to division by the court. 
Alice J. Nail asserts that the problem 
is solved by precedents in our State which 
recognize that a professional man can ac-
quire and voluntarily sell good will. Cited 
are Randolph v. Graham, 254 S.W. 402 
(Tex.Civ.App. 1923, writ ref'd) where it 
was stated that "[t]he good will of a pro-
fessional man may be as much an asset 
and a thing to be sold as that of a mer-
chan t" ; Sanderfur v. Beard, 249 S.W. 
274 (Tex.Civ.App.1923, no writ) and 
Yeakley v. Gaston, 50 Tex.Civ.App. 405, 
111 S.W. 76S (Tex.Civ.App.1908, no writ). 
So it is said, the husband's medical practice 
with its good will was owned by the marital 
partners; and as such, it was property in 
existence at the time of the divorce that was 
subject to valuation and partition in a man-
ner within the discretion of the trial court. 
We have found no case in point and 
solution of the problem is not easy. The 
division of authority on the question of 
whether good will may exist in a profession 
7. NAIL Tex. 7 6 3 
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dependent on personal qualities of the 
owner has been stated in this manner: 
" . . . It has frequently been held 
that good will does not adhere to a busi-
ness or profession dependent solely on 
the personal ability, skill, integrity, or 
other personal characteristics of the 
owner. According to other decisions, 
however, good will may exist in a pro-
fessional as well as a commercial busi-
ness, and may be sold together with the 
estate, and, irrespective of whether there 
is technically a good will adherent to a 
business or profession dependent on per-
sonal qualities of the owner, contracts 
disposing thereof coupled with an agree-
ment that the seller would not compete, 
if otherwise valid, are enforced. In any 
case, an involuntary sale cannot be made 
of a good will based on professional 
reputation. 38 CJ.S. Good Will § 3, 
pp. 952-953 
It is generally held that good will has no 
existence as property in and of itself, as a 
separate and distinct entity, but only as an 
incident of a continuing business having 
locality or name. 38 Am.Jur.2d, Good Will, 
§ 3, p. 914, and cases there cited. The rule 
has been otherwise stated that as good will 
must adhere to some principal property or 
right, the extinction of such right operates 
to extinguish the good will dependent on it. 
38 CJ .S . Good Will § 4, p. 953. It has been 
held that good will cannot be levied upon 
in satisfaction of debts. Lilienthal v. 
Drucklieb, (Cir. 1898) 84 F. 918. It is the 
rule in Tennessee that there can be no 
forced sale or transfer of good will based 
upon professional reputation and standing 
against one not assenting. Hunt v. Street, 
182 Tenn. 167, 184 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn.1945) ; 
Slack v. Suddoth, 102 Tenn. 375, 52 S.W. 
180, 45 L.R.A. 589. The distinction has 
been drawn that professional good will is 
not so much fixed or as localized as the 
good will of a trade, and attaches to the 
person of the professional man or woman 
as a result of confidence in his or her skill 
and ability. Finch Bros. v. Michael, 167 
N.C. 322, 83 S.E. 458 (1914). 
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In any event, it cannot be said that the 
accrued good will in the medical practice 
of Dr. Nail was an earned or vested prop-
erty right at the time of the divorce or that 
it qualifies as property subject to division 
by decree of the court. It did not possess 
value or constitute an asset separate and 
apart from his person, or from his individ-
ual ability to practice his profession. It 
would be extinguished in event of his death, 
or retirement, or disablement, as well as in 
event of the sale of his practice or the loss 
of his patients, whatever the cause. Cf. 
Busby v. Busby, 457 S.\V.2d 551 (Tex. 19/0), 
and the cases there referred to with ap-
proval, where the husband's existing entitle-
ment to future military retirement benefits 
was held to constitute a vested property 
right. The crucial consideration was the 
vesting of a right when the husband 
reached the requisite qualifications for re-
tirement benefits; the fact that the bene-
fits were subject to divestment under cer-
tain conditions did not reduce the right to a 
mere expectancy. The good will of the 
husband's medical practice here, on the 
other hand, may not be characterized as 
an earned or vested right or one which 
fixes any benefit in any sum at any future 
time. That it would have value in the 
future is no more than an expectancy 
wholly dependent upon the continuation of 
existing circumstances. Accordingly, we 
hold that the good will of petitioner's med-
ical practice that may have accrued at the 
time of the divorce was not property in the 
estate of the parties; and that for this 
reason the award under attack was not 
within the authority and discretion vested 
•in the trial court by Section 3.63 of the 
Texas Family Code. 
It is to be understood that in resolving 
the question at hand we are not concerned 
with good will as an asset incident to the 
sale of a professional practice, or that rriay 
exist in a professional partnership or cor-
poration apart from the person of an in-
dividual member, or that may be an ele-
ment of damage by reason of tortious con-
duct. 
The judgments below arc reversed and 
the cause is remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Jimmy Lee JACKSON, Appellant, 
v. 
The STATE of Texas, Appellee. 
No. 40224. 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. 
Get. IK, 1972. 
Rehearing Denied Doe. <;, 11)72. 
Defendant was convicted in the Crimi-
nal District Court Xo. 5, Dallas County, 
Av.U., Utt\ lkv>svt v.wd Ed (v5ss<ctt, J}., <z>i 
robbery by assault, and he appealed. The 
Court of Criminal Appeals, Davis, C, held 
that evidence including victim's identifica-
tion of defendant as man who stabbed and 
robbed him and testimony of police officer 
that property taken from victim was found 
on defendant's person shortly after robbery 
was sufficient to support defendant's con-
viction. 
Affirmed. 
1. Robbery C=24(l) 
Evidence including victim's identifica-
tion of defendant ::? man who stabbed and 
robbed him and testimony of police officer 
that property taken from victim was found 
on defendant's person shortly after robbery 
was sufficient to support defendant's co:> 
2. Indictment and Information C=M68 
The specific allegation in an indict-
ment when two or more defendants are 
charged with the same offense that defend-
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